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Abstract 
 
This paper makes the argument that though Argentina’s 2001 financial 
crisis was influenced by several factors, it is the 1991 Convertibility Plan that 
most strongly pushed the nation to the point of needing outside financial 
assistance. Its implementation led to and worked in combination with a 
multitude of unexpected factors. Together, these created economic conditions 
that chipped away at the stability of Argentina’s economy. 
 Given the nature of this project, information was gathered solely 
through research in texts published by both supporters and critics of 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund.  In my readings, I found 
that there is generally more criticism than praise, though I tried not to be 
swayed too strongly either way. Ultimately, however, it became clear that a 
decision on outside organizations did not need to be made. Rather, it was clear 
that a criticism of policy would suffice. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 This paper examines the factors that led to the 2001 financial crisis in 
Argentina. In this examination the claim is made that the 1991 convertibility 
regime was the main catalyst for the circumstances that led to the dire state of 
Argentina’s economy and ultimately left the nation without credit on a global 
scale.  
 Established by President Carlos Menem and Economy Minister 
Domingo Cavallo, the 1991 convertibility regime was implemented as a 
response to the decades of economic instability and chronic inflation that 
Argentina had suffered from. Prior to its installation, the nation’s Central 
Bank had turned towards printing money, instigating inflation and making it 
an unattractive nation for investors and foreign capital. To remedy this, the 
convertibility regime limited the Central Bank’s ability to print money and 
tried to create a more appealing economic atmosphere for investors. Pegging 
the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar on a one-to-one basis and creating new 
restrictions did this. The issue was that success was short-term. That is, the 
expected results were achieved during a limited period of years. However, the 
benefits of the convertibility plan were ultimately overshadowed by the 
unexpected consequences.  
Upon its implementation, the convertibility plan instigated a series of 
planned results along with many unintended consequences. Restrictions were 
put in place, such as limiting the Central Bank’s control and forbidding it from 
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printing money. Initially, these aided in achieving the goals of the 
convertibility plan. Inflation was lowered to single digits within several years 
and the economy saw significant growth. Additionally, the Real Gross 
Domestic Product rose to double digits. The Real Gross Domestic Product 
(Real GDP) looks at the Gross Domestic Product of a nation and adjusts for 
inflation. Growth in Real GDP is typically a strong indicator of positive 
movement in an economy. So, it in combination with lowered inflation, imply 
that the convertibility plan was successful in achieving its goals.  
Achievement could also be seen in the influx of foreign capital into 
Argentina. The US dollar had grown strong over the decades and this made 
currencies connected to it attractive by association. When the convertibility 
plan pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar, investing in Argentina 
became a more secure and compelling decision for foreign investors. 
Additionally, the high interest rates in Argentina drew in foreign investors, 
because they were sure to receive a premium in return for their money. 
Although this was initially a benefit for Argentina, it ultimately became an 
area of vulnerability.  
Argentina’s attractiveness to foreign capital was contingent upon its 
economic stability. During the 1990s decade, external shocks revealed 
Argentina’s economic insecurity and the extent to which it was affected by 
events elsewhere around the world. For example, Mexico’s Tequila Crisis, 
Russia’s default, and the depreciation of the Brazilian real all translated to 
economic issues for Argentina. When these occurred, Argentina’s economy 
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revealed the extent to which it was dependent upon other economies, 
particularly those attached to the dollar.  
In these moments of weakness, the entry of foreign capital lowered. 
Argentina’s consequent suffering revealed that the nation was too reliant upon 
it. This was exemplified in the domestic markets’ inabilities to support 
Argentina’s financial needs when they most needed to. That is, when foreign 
capital was not available for use, Argentina’s economy could not survive on 
its own. Here it begins to be clear that the convertibility plan forced Argentina 
to become reliant upon foreign capital. It simply replaced the action of 
printing money (the inflationary practices that had previously been employed) 
with spending with borrowed money. This becomes very clear when 
considering the nation’s debt dynamics and trade balance. 
The convertibility plan led Argentina to stifle its own domestic 
economy while becoming dependent upon and utilizing foreign capital. This is 
undeniably clear when considering the nation’s lowered exportation and sharp 
increase in importation of goods. Essentially, this means that they were 
buying more than they were selling—and, what’s worse, they were doing so 
with borrowed money in the form of foreign capital. The fiscal policies of 
Argentina reflect this irresponsibility, whose unsustainable nature was 
reflected in federal spending. 
The nature of Argentina’s institutional and political structure is also 
attributed to the 2001 financial crisis, although the convertibility regime bears 
a correlation to this as well. Systematically, Argentina’s structure makes it 
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difficult to enforce regulations, such as those that were mandated as 
restrictions for the convertibility plan. The politics are such that provincial 
governments have the potential to bypass orders from the federal government, 
rendering the convertibility regime’s limits nearly useless. Additionally, the 
political system appeared to be relatively unstable with several resignations 
from major leaders within days of each other. This insecurity registers as 
overall instability for investors, which leads to the withdrawal of foreign 
capital. It is here that the unexpected results of the convertibility plan are 
shown. It was implemented in a nation where structural issues could lead to a 
failure of upholding restrictions. This, in combination with the vulnerabilities 
it created, ultimately made it ineffective. Although well intended, the 
convertibility plan ultimately generated more negative consequences than it 
did success. 
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My best advice for future Honors students is to pick a topic that you 
will be able to maintain an interest in and a curiosity for. This process is very 
long and, at times, its completion can feel impossible. There is no worse 
decision to make than to choose a topic that you have limited interest in. 
Equally important is that you are capable of having a dynamic approach to 
completing your proposed project. For this paper, for example, I initially 
excelled in finding readings and conducting research, but struggled in 
constructing my own views on the subject.  
Advice that you will likely hear from every present and past Honors 
student is to work hard early on, so as to make life a little easier when 
everything else gets piled on. Manage your time wisely and above all, respect 
what your adviser has to say! 
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Preface 
 
Nearly every nation in Latin America has suffered economic turmoil 
over the past century. While economic turbulence certainly extends further 
beyond this in history, it is over the past few decades that a distinct pattern has 
developed in which very similar remedies were employed in each troubled 
nation. The implemented solutions are typically heavily neoliberal and are 
instilled under the recommendation of international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
This Capstone Presentation began with my intentions of researching 
the policies and patterns implemented in Latin America. My beginning 
research led to a decision to narrow my scope, which I did by specifically 
choosing the nation of Argentina and its 2001 economic collapse. What began 
as research on implemented neoliberal policies, ultimately led to the decision 
to examine the factors leading to Argentina’s economic collapse, the 
subsequent responses and solutions of both the nation and are drafted 
International Monetary Fund. 
Although many of the contributors to the demise of Argentina’s 
economy were specific to the nation, many were also due to the nation’s 
contingency upon the success of other nations and transactions. This made the 
research very interesting and, perhaps more importantly, translatable to other 
situations. It is here that I made the decision to draw comparisons between the 
current situation in Greece and this past interaction. Although the writing is 
largely focused on Argentina’s financial crisis (because it has been the 
regional and economic focus from the start), the inclusion of a cross-
examination of Greece offers a more dynamic approach and superior subject 
matter for this paper. 
Given this connection, this paper is meant to explore and express the 
delicate balance that is the result of an increasingly globalized and 
interconnected economic world. Certainly, there are benefits and in many 
cases reduced risk when there is a financial system supported by and/or 
bearing connections to other currencies or nations. For example, many 
consider Greece’s fate to not be sealed only because of its use of the Euro and 
its ability to fall back on stronger nations such as Germany and France. Some 
extremists, however, argue that Greece’s situation will lead to the demise of 
the Euro-using nations altogether. Although both of these arguments, 
particularly the latter, are relatively extreme, the overarching theme is that 
there is a strong correlation between nations and their fates are somewhat tied 
to one another. An examination of Argentina’s past issues, alongside Greece’s 
present ones, exemplifies this. It is in drawing attention to this that this paper 
succeeds in bringing light to an important connection from which much can be 
learned. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
According to the Independent Evaluation Office, “Until the depositor 
runs started to accelerate in the spring of 2001, the Argentina banking system 
was considered to be a model for emerging market economies in terms of 
prudential standards, capitalization, and liquidity.1” The question remains, 
what transitioned Argentina’s system from exemplary to insolvent? The 
reality is that there are a multitude of accused factors that together worked to 
create a climate that provoked the demise of Argentina’s economic reforms. In 
an evaluation of the circumstances performed by the aforementioned 
Independent Evaluation Office (although it bears a connection to the 
International Monetary Fund in its origin, the Independent Evaluation Office 
[founded in 20012] claims complete independence from the Fund and its past 
decisions), there have been a total of eight distinct factors indentified, ranging 
from external shocks to the decline in capital flows. 
                                                 
1 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
2 The Independent Evaluation Office, 2014. 
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss these conditions existing in 
Argentina’s economy that forced the nation to seek financial help from an 
external organization. Essentially, put under a spotlight will be the underlying 
factors that created the imbalance that forced the nation to need financial 
assistance. Additionally, Argentina’s subsequent credit-worthiness will be 
noted—namely the nation’s indebtedness to foreign currency. Given that it is 
today still unable to re-enter the global credit market, it is clear that the 
nation’s default on debt and currency devaluation has had lasting effects on 
the nation’s success on a global stage. In today’s economic world, in fact, it is 
seemingly used as a cautionary tale for nations with large fiscal deficits that 
hope to finance large fiscal deficits by accessing global debt markets, like 
Greece. 
Although there are a number of factors typically held responsible for 
the economic and financial disruptions, I would like to make the argument 
that the convertibility regime was the central player in the Argentine financial 
crisis. Certainly other areas of influence existed, but ultimately it was the 
convertibility plan and both its intended and unintended consequences that 
contributed the most in creating the nation’s difficult financial climate.   
 15 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: 
 The Convertibility Plan 
 
 
 
 
The Origin and Actions of the Plan 
Established in April 1991, the Convertibility Plan seems to have 
paradoxically contributed to both the support and the demise of Argentina’s 
economic structure. In its creation, the Convertibility Plan was intended as a 
solution to the chronic inflation problem that the nation faced. It seems that 
irresponsible money printing from the Argentine Central Bank, in 
combination with several other factors, had led to decades of inflation and 
economic insecurity for the nation. Subsequently, it was globally viewed as an 
unstable investment for foreign investors.  
The nation was in need of a change and they found it in the form of the 
convertibility regime. So, what exactly was the convertibility regime? In 
short, “President Carlos Menem and Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo 
established a new exchange regime for the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar 
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and limited the Central Bank’s ability to create new money by requiring it to 
back the monetary base with foreign exchange reserves3.”  
According to Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy, 
“The essential objective of the plan was to end decades of financial and 
economic instability by ensuring that Argentina would have sound money. 
This was to be accomplished by linking the value of the domestic currency at 
parity to the US dollar, with the guarantee that pesos could be exchanged for 
dollars at will. The Argentine Central Bank was given independence from the 
government, under the mandate that it maintain convertibility by holding 
dollar reserves against its domestic monetary liabilities (currency and 
commercial bank reserves).”4 Pegging the peso to the US dollar offered a 
more appealing currency for foreign investors to rely on, whose subsequent 
capital would benefit Argentina. A very similar experiment had been tried in 
the 1970s by Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz and Central Bank president 
Adolf Diz with less extreme but almost identical consequences. 
Originally, this currency board system, which matched the US dollar 
to the peso on a one-to-one basis5, was an appealing solution to Argentina—
and was later even supported by the International Monetary Fund.6 In addition 
                                                 
3 Joseph P. Joyce, The IMF and Global Financial Crises: Phoenix Rising? 
(2012), 127. 
4 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002), 
20. 
5 Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Todd A. Knoop, 2013, page 
133. 
6 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, IEO, 2003. 
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to being pegged to the U.S. dollar, the peso would be fully backed by foreign 
reserves in order to maintain confidence in the currency7.  
Professor Knoop of Cornell College explains the expected outcome: 
“The idea behind this currency board was to credibly reduce money growth 
and inflation while at the same time fixing the exchange rate of the peso to the 
dollar. In addition, the currency board promised to protect the independence 
of a Central Bank that had shown itself to be part and parcel of the volatile 
Argentinian political system. In other words, the currency board would be a 
way to force the Central Bank of Argentina to make the tough decisions it had 
never been able to make in the past.8” 
 
Restrictions 
Defense mechanisms were put in place to aid in the avoidance of the 
inflation that Argentina’s economy had often fallen prey to. For example, in 
emergency situations a 100 percent reserve requirement could easily transition 
to an 80 percent requirement, while the Central Bank could hold up to 20 
percent of its assets in government debt.9 Additionally, the Central Bank was 
forbidden from printing money to finance governmental expenditures, thus 
                                                 
7 Todd A. Knoop, Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies (2013), 
133. 
8 Todd A. Knoop, Global Finance in Emerging Market Economies (2013), 
133. 
9 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
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building a mechanism to avoid the aforementioned perpetual problem in 
Argentina of expeditious inflation.10  
The above limits and others installed were intended to prevent a 
defense against the past issues that the Argentine and similar economies had 
suffered from. They, along with the entire convertibility regime, were 
representative of a progression away from old toxic habits and towards new 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
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Chapter Two: 
The Intended Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Tackling Inflation 
The convertibility regime’s implementation followed decades of 
economic and financial unrest in Argentina.  One of the largest blanket issues 
that the plan aimed to tackle was inflation. This issue is typically derived from 
the lack of political independence of the Central Bank. In the case of 
Argentina, the Central Bank had been chronically been charged as the arm of 
the government for achieving social goods. The measures taken under the 
convertibility regime, it seems, were initially effective. According to the 
Independent Evaluation Office, “After the adoption of the Convertibility Plan, 
stabilization was achieved quickly and with the aid of structural reforms, the 
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economy grew at an average rate of 6 percent per year through 1997.11” As 
can be seen in the diagram12 below, inflation did somewhat drop off with 
these installments. 
 
In fact, Argentina’s inflation fell to single digits by 1993. This is the result of 
the initial monetary stability that came with the outcomes of the convertibility 
regime. In its implementation, the plan led to an influx of foreign capital 
based on its attractiveness and stability to foreign investors. 
                                                 
11 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003, 3. 
12 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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Real GDP Growth 
In addition to the above alteration in inflation, the convertibility plan 
originally resulted in Real GDP growth—a relative contrast to the trends in 
the 1980s. This can also be seen in the previous chart, particularly the rise to 
about 10 percent in 1992. The chart below looks at a five year moving average 
of the Real GDP growth for Argentina.13 
 
 
With the exception of changes made by events such as the 1995 Tequila 
Crisis, which resulted in a plummet of economic activity, the Real GDP 
                                                 
13 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
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appears to exhibit growth.14 Both the growth in Real GDP and the lowering of 
inflation were intended factors for the convertibility regime. 
 
Tapping Global Credit Markets 
 To its credit, the convertibility regime opened Argentina’s doors to 
opportunities for foreign investors to enter the market. What made the 
Argentine market so appealing was the peso’s backing of the U.S. dollar. The 
United States’ increasing economic stability was rendering it the economic 
powerhouse of the west. Argentina’s attachment to its currency cast a positive 
light on the peso, making it more attractive. Foreign investors were drawn in 
by the assurance of such a strong currency and an influx of foreign capital 
ensued. The aforementioned rise in GDP indicates this. Along with the 
advantageous attachment to the U.S. dollar, investors were also drawn in 
by the high interest rates. Note the graph15 on the following page .The spread 
of interest rates indicate that foreign investors would benefit from placing 
foreign capital in the Argentine market. These features were initially 
beneficial to the Argentine economy, as displayed in the growth of Real GDP 
and the lowered inflation. In a way, when looking at these aspects and this 
time period, it could be argued that the convertibility plan was successful. It 
did, after all, achieve its goals in the short-term. Ultimately, however, the 
                                                 
14 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
15 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
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intended results were short-lived while unintended consequences proved to be 
far more damaging. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Unintended Consequences 
 
 
 
 
External Shocks and Decline in Capital Flow 
 In spite of the positive activity that seemed to be occurring, 
there were in reality deeper and more negative factors at play. The short-term 
successes of the convertibility plan were overshadowed by its deficiencies and 
unintended consequences. The overarching issue with this situation seems to 
be that while money growth and inflation may have been corrected, it was not 
a solution to the economic turmoil of Argentina. Rather, the Convertibility 
Plan seems to have created an artificial access to foreign markets that lulled 
the nation into a false sense of security. The insecurity of this regime can be 
exemplified in external episodes that affected the nation’s economy. Mexico’s 
Tequila Crisis, Russia’s default, and the depreciation of the Brazilin real all 
exemplify the fragility that the convertibility regime impressed upon the 
Argentine economy. The instability stems from an influx of foreign capital as 
a result of the peg of the peso to the dollar.  
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Two of the unexpected consequences of the convertibility regime are 
strongly intermingled and carry a great deal of power in their ability to 
translate into modern-day issues. In an increasingly globalized world, there 
are a plethora of benefits that can come to individuals, firms, and 
governments. Increased communication and trade on an international scale has 
led to greater capabilities in terms of efficiency, cost, and so on. However, one 
could argue that it has also led to a drastic sense of dependency between 
sovereign nations, firms, and individuals. That is to say, the globalized world 
has led to a much more fragile and intermingled set of interactions in which 
activity in one part of the world can greatly affect activity elsewhere. The 
strong correlation between the decline in capital flows and external shocks 
exemplify this reliance and the effect that it can have. More so, however, it 
displays a major unintended consequence of the convertibility plan. 
 Firstly, let us focus on the decline in capital flows and the 
phenomenon’s effect on the crisis. At the hands of the convertibility plan, 
Argentina’s reliance on capital inflows was too heavy. That is, the nation’s 
domestic financial markets were merely slowly developing and could not 
support the nation’s needs if there were to be an international shift and the 
capital flows were to falter.  
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When such a shift did occur, the domestic markets seemed incapable 
of supporting the financial needs of Argentina16. The 2003 I.E.O. report 
elaborates: “When there was a sharp reduction (or “sudden stop” as it is 
sometimes called) in global capital flows to emerging market economies in 
1998, it became increasingly costly for Argentina to raise funds on 
international capital markets. When the investors sensed a shift, the money 
fled. Because of the convertibility regime, and because of the relatively small 
size of its export sector, Argentina could not easily adapt to the shock through 
a rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate.17”  
The unpredictable swinging of global capital flows in combination 
with the nation’s poor domestic financial infrastructure worked together to 
contribute to the collapse in Argentina’s economy. This is exemplified in the 
intense and continued rise on Argentina’s bonds over U.S. Treasuries, as seen 
in the graph18 on the following page. It is in this example that we can see the 
correlation between the decline in capital flows and the series of adverse 
external shocks—and how their connection is through the convertibility 
regime.  
                                                 
16 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003, 6. 
17 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003, 5-6. 
18 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003, 4. 
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 The external shocks show Argentina’s vulnerability to the decisions of 
foreign investors. Similarly to the less-stable nations in the European Union 
(i.e. Greece), Argentina seems to have initially benefited from the 
performance and conditions of others. During the successful times in 
Argentina’s economic history, it seems to have often been because of 
favorable conditions elsewhere. External shocks, however, led to the fast 
deterioration of these favorable circumstances, ultimately leading Argentina—
so delicately holding on to the coattails of others—to suffer.  
The I.E.O. elaborates with examples: “Among the external shocks 
were the Russian/LTCM crises of 1998, which led to a reduction in capital 
flows to emerging market economies and an increase in risk premia; the 
devaluation of the Brazilian real, which had a negative impact on the 
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competitiveness of Argentina’s exports; and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
against most currencies in the late 1990s, which increased Argentina’s real 
effective exchange rate; and the global economic slowdown that started in the 
beginning of 2001, which depressed the price of Argentina’s main exports,” 
19
. Argentina’s performance is contingent upon the success or demise, in 
Brazil’s case, of others. This unintended result of the convertibility regime left 
Argentina more vulnerable to the global markets than ever. It is in these 
aspects that Argentina is most commonly used as a cautionary tale for other 
nations. A delicate balance such as this ought to be maneuvered so that the 
proportions of international and domestic vulnerability are lowered. The 
convertibility regime did quite the opposite. 
 
Structural Reform and Debt Dynamics 
Somewhat homogenous to the two aforementioned are the issues with 
structural reform in Argentina’s economy. Reportedly, in order to adhere to 
new policies, there needed to be a liberalization of certain markets (i.e. 
product markets, foreign trade, utilities and infrastructure20) and an overall 
limitation on imports. A report states, “While many direct and indirect trade 
barriers were removed, and while exports did grow steadily, by the end of the  
                                                 
19 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003, 6. 
20 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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1990s Argentina was still a relatively closed economy.”21 This is directly 
connected to the aforementioned external shocks and decline in capital flow, 
given that a balance was lost when the number of exports did not nearly meet 
the number of imports or use of foreign capital. 
The imbalance mentioned above very simply describes an instrumental 
element of the issue of Argentina’s debt dynamics. Essentially, the nature of 
Argentina’s trade balance—and the duly noted trade barriers—created debt to 
the nations from whom they were importing. Given that exportation was 
lesser, the imbalance is relatively easily explained.  
Consider the Trade and Current Account Balance on the following 
page.22 The current account is perpetually negative—though it shrinks during 
the 1995 Tequila Crisis. Although the trade balance does not have the same 
negative consistency, it is not necessarily steady in any particular direction. It 
seems that while the inflation remained low and the Real GDP great 
throughout the 1990s, as intended by the convertibility plan, the underlying 
factors outweighed these two benefits in terms of overall influence on the state 
of the economy.  
 
                                                 
21 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
22 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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Of the underlying factors, it appears that exports—or lack thereof, 
comparatively—was one of the largest outcomes of the convertibility plan that 
affected the state of the balance sheet. This is also reflected in the nation’s 
breakdown of debt. 
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As can be seen in the graphic23 the following page, in comparison to 
the similarly featured nations of Chile, New Zealand, Spain, and Turkey, 
Argentina has incredibly low export ratio in the years between 1967 and 2001. 
 
 
 
 
This lack of export ratio strength or, for that matter, linear growth, is a 
result of the installment and consequent repercussions of the Convertibility 
Plan. In the years following the implementation of the convertibility regime, 
                                                 
23 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
Export Ratios (in percent of GDP) 1967-2001: Argentina, 
Chile, New Zealand, Spain, and Turkey 
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Argentina’s exports declined while the number of imports increased relatively 
dramatically. The largest issue with this is that the increasing number of 
imports is funded by the savings generated by foreign exchange, not by 
domestic production. Essentially, these imports are made with borrowed  
 
 
money generated by temporary foreign investment. That is, it is funded by the 
foreign capital of investors that can easily remove their money when scared. 
This dependency was created by the convertibility plan and forced the 
Argentine economy to take on an even greater imbalance between exports and 
imports.  
 
Fiscal Policies 
 
 The convertibility regime unintentionally created an atmosphere that 
perpetuated and even worsened the fiscal policies of Argentina. Often 
described as chronically unstable, Argentina’s unsustainable fiscal policies are 
seemingly inherent to the nation, given their frequency. On the surface, it is 
seemingly a simple issue of living beyond their means. That is to say, the 
Argentine government spends more than can or is collected in taxes when 
satisfying political needs and pressures24. The tendency is to then satiate the 
political needs and pressures by borrowing domestically and internationally, 
                                                 
24 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
 33 
 
wherever credit is available25. In an increasingly globalized marketplace, and 
because of the dollar-backed peso, credit in the form of investment of foreign 
capital in Argentina became easily accessible. Naturally, it was made all the 
more available by the convertibility regime and the appeal that it created for 
foreign investors. The consequential fiscal realities versus Argentina’s targets 
over the years can be seen graphically26 below. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
26 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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With some dramatic liberties, Mussa describes the habits of the 
Argentine government: “This is what happened during the presidency of Raul 
Alfonsin, culminating in the hyperinflation of 1990. With some differences in 
the details, but none of the central substance, it is also what happened in the 
events that culminated in several earlier financial crises during the preceding 
50 years. Thus, in the management of its fiscal affairs, the Argentine 
government is like a chronic alcoholic—once it starts to imbibe the political 
pleasures of deficit spending, it keeps on going until it reaches the economic 
equivalent of falling down drunk.27” The fiscal policies of the decade of 1990-
2000 seemed to mimic these issues on an even more extreme and more 
irresponsible level that has continued to affect the nation into today. The 
unreasonable spending, funded by false currency, worked in unison with the 
                                                 
27 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002) 
10. 
 35 
 
other factors to ruin the credit and economic stability of Argentina. 
 
Institutional and Political Factors 
The institutional and political factors involved in Argentina are 
perhaps the least mutable of the contributors to the economic crisis, given 
their relation to the electoral process and the governmental structure. 
However, their influence on Argentina’s fate became stronger when foreign 
capital entered following the convertibility plan’s implementation. The status 
of the institution and political figures of a nation can be an indicator to foreign 
investors of the stability. That is, when there are low turnover rates for 
positions and responsible decisions are made, investors see security. This 
connection is an unanticipated and detrimental result of the convertibility 
plan. 
 In the 1990s and well before then, the federal government was 
incapable of strongly implementing and adhering to any new fiscal policies, 
particularly those regarding austerity measures. An I.E.O. report indicates that 
firstly the issue of the electoral politics existed.28 That is, the need for votes 
led to activity from elected officials to be lax.29 Similarly, there remained an 
issue with the provincial governments. It seems that the provincial 
                                                 
28 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
29 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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governments were given both too much power and responsibility, particularly 
in comparison with the federal government. That is, “In general, the 
considerable power of the provincial governments, in a context where 
provinces had been entrusted with major public expenditure responsibilities, 
greatly reduced the flexibility of fiscal policy.”30  
Systematically, the institution of Argentina’s politics makes it very 
difficult for policies to be strictly adhered to. During this decade of 
Argentina’s economic turmoil, the nation also appeared to be plagued by low 
retention rates for political leaders. The constantly altering cabinet members 
in Argentina’s federal government seemed to drastically lower confidence 
from both the domestic and international point of view. For example, the 
resignation of Vice President Carlos Álvarez in October 2000 and the 
successive resignations of two ministers of economy (José Luis Machinea and 
Ricardo López Murphy) occurred all within twenty days in March.31 The 
lowered confidence is best exemplified in the aforementioned reduction in 
capital flows. Lowered confidence as the result of institutional and political 
instability can be detrimental to a nation, as they the income of capital can 
shift or cease altogether. 
 
                                                 
30 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
31 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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Chapter 4: The Result 
 
 
 
 
 
The Banking System 
As part of the convertibility regime, the Central Bank of Argentina 
was meant to act as a lender only as a last resort.32 For example, in emergency 
situations a 100 percent reserve requirement could easily transition to an 80 
percent requirement, while the Central Bank could hold up to 20 percent of its 
assets in government debt.33 However, the combined economic factors (e.g. 
the flight of foreign capital, external factors, etc.) essentially forced the nation 
to turn back to their Central Bank.  
A report elaborates: “By the end of 2001…. the cumulative effects of 
several years’ recession, a year’s capital flight and a series of controversial 
                                                 
32 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
33 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (2002). 
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policy moves had left the banking system vulnerable to any further blows to 
public confidence. It has widely been argued that the manner in which 
authorities tried to manage the exit from convertibility—including the legally 
ambiguous measures to block deposits, and the forced conversion of dollar-
denominated bank assets and liabilities into pesos at asymmetric rates—
compounded these weaknesses. As a result, Argentina entered 2002 with not 
only a currency and sovereign debt crisis, but a banking crisis as well.”34 The 
picture that is painted is reflective of the reality that the convertibility plan 
was unsustainable and inappropriate for Argentina’s economy. Further, it 
depicts the overarching message that the convertibility regime resulted in far 
more unintended and harmful outcomes than it did positive results. 
 
Conclusion 
When considering any financial situation, it is difficult to distinguish 
or pinpoint one overarching reason for the ensuing economic disarray. In the 
case of the Argentine crisis, the Independent Evaluation Office found eight 
factors: fiscal policy, the convertibility regime, decline in capital flows, 
structural reform, institutional and political factors, external shocks, debt 
                                                 
34 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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dynamics, and the banking system35. Although each of these influences were 
all intricate pieces in the ensuing economic environment, one stands out as 
having the strongest impact on the economic stability of Argentina. This 
influential element is the convertibility regime and the false sense of security 
that it created. 
Pegging the peso to the US dollar intentionally made investment in the 
Argentine economy more appealing to those with foreign capital. The high 
interest rates, backed by the US dollar, make a comfortable situation for a 
foreign investor. From the Argentine perspective, it seems that only the 
income of money was seen, and not the fragility that resulted. The growth in 
the Gross Domestic Product and trade account essentially allowed Argentina 
to finance the governmental and national needs with borrowed money from 
foreign investors.  
It appears that the influx of foreign capital did not spark the production 
expected in the economy, but rather financed the continued and increased 
importation of goods. This, in combination with the poor institutional factors 
and political decisions brought Argentina to its knees. And the majority of this 
was at the hands of the 1991 Convertibility Plan. While other influences were 
certainly at hand, it is ultimately the plan’s intended and more powerful 
unintended consequences that forced Argentina into a position in which it 
needed to turn to the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance.  
                                                 
35 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002: Issues Paper/Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office, IEO, July 
2003. 
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